Kant mentions Aristotle and Aristote- lian philosophers only a hundred times in all his works printed and manuscript. In this book, I will examine the most relevant passages.
We must confess openly that concerning these kinds of sources we have no evidence in other authors that Kant read Aristotelian works, nor do the textbooks he used during his lessons testify to a good knowledge of the Aristotelian tradition. In his recent book, Graham Bird maintains that there is a major division in the interpretation of Kant, between traditionalists and revolutionaries. He recognizes that the traditionalist position was once dominant, but that in the last thirty years revolutionary interpretations have found more favor.
In my view, logic, epistemology, and methodology are the key disciplines to understanding how and why Kant elaborated his new transcendental philosophy, with the Critique of Pure Reason stand- ing as an independent eclectic form of philosophy against Wolian rationalism and British empiricism.
From the logical standpoint, the enterprise of criticism began only with the discovery of the Aristotelian doc- trine of categories as an essential part in the conception of synthetic a priori knowledge, in other words ater Kant, however, came to this doctrine only ater two decades of failed attempts and only, as I have already mentioned, ater turning away from Wolian rational- ism and British empiricism. Historical comparisons between Kant and Aristotle in the ields of metaphysics, logic, and methodology are few and far between.
Privileging the Aristotelian tradition, however, does not mean reducing the Critique of Pure Reason to a work related exclusively to Aristotelianism: such an attempt would be totally misleading. It would be a mistake to say that in this survey Kant is presented as an Aristotelian: he is in fact treated as such only to the extent that he makes use of Aristotelian doctrines to solve certain, by no means trivial, problems in his philosophy.
During the second half of the sixteenth century, Aristotelianism in Europe beneited from the dissemination of new editions of Aris- totelian writings. From there it spread all over Europe, gaining purchase in Protestant Germany, in particular, where a reading of Aristotle expurgated of Catholic and Scholastic issues was warmly received during the Reformation, thanks primarily to Philipp Melanchthon. In particular, it is possible to recognize a shit in interest from dialectics to the methodology of sciences as a result of the widespread dissemination of the ideas of Paduan Aristotelianism at the Albertina, especially those of Jacopo Zabarella.
It was not only the oicial philosophy according to the university statute, but it was widely recognized, as well as highly regarded, for its opposition to the modern thinkers.
Ater Rabe, the most important Aristotelian was Johann Jakob Rohde, professor of logic from to He professed Aristotelianism through- out his academic life, as his academic program Meditatione philo- sophica qua Aristotelica sapientissimus de veritate shows. Both scholars were deeply involved in Aristotelian philosophy. To the ield of logic he contributed the Elementa philosophiae rationalis seu logicae , the result of a decade of teaching that was studied also by Kant during his university years.
In the second half of the sixteenth century, there was a renewed interested in Aristo- telianism with the dissemination of the works of Jacopo Zabarella. Aristotelianism was characterized by a careful exegesis of Aristote- lian works in the original Greek, and by the production of large com- mentaries and propaedeutic companions, while Scholastic Protestant philosophy aimed to establish methodologically the relations among the various philosophical disciplines, in particular the connection with theology, the queen of all disciplines.
Both these philosophical perspectives denied modern science and methodology, preferring to be anchored in their own traditions instead. In this sense, both Aris- totelianism and Protestant Scholastic philosophy were conservative.
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, teachings show that Protestant Scholastic philosophy had lost out to Aristotelianism. Philosophy itself was subordinated to the teaching of the Bible, dogmatics, ethics, and catechism. Diferent was the situation of the Aristotelians, who, though mar- ginalized, had not been banned, and continued to profess their doc- trines, albeit iltered through the Eclectic perspective.
Both Pietists and Aristotelians rejected modern science and its philosophical approach. Meanwhile, English empiricists such as Locke were gaining popularity, and by the end of s the works of Chris- tian August Crusius were enjoying great success. Furthermore, second-generation Wolian text- books also incorporated Lockean ideas and doctrines.
Kant was to some extent inluenced by it at least up to , thanks also to the predominance of the Berlin Academy, which favored Crusians over Wolians. To conclude, in the s, ater an early dissemination of Wolf- ianism, Pietism became dominant, favoring Eclecticism, which included among its exponents the Aristotelians.
Eclecticism did not undermine religious authority, being directed primarily toward the investigation of philosophical truth, and overlooking theological issues. Meanwhile, Lockean and Crusian philosophy, thanks also to the sup- port of the Berlin Academy, won widespread acclaim at the expense of Wolian rationalist doctrines, especially among the younger fac- ulty members. Special features of the third.
In Epistemology, Laurence Bonjour introduces the serious philosophy student to the history and concepts of epistemology, while simultaneously challenging them to take an active part in its ongoing debates. The text reflects BonJour's conviction that the place to start any discussion of the theories of knowledge is with the classical. Political Epistemology. The first edited collection to explore one of the most rapidly growing area of philosophy: political epistemology.
The volume brings together leading philosophers to explore ways in which the analytic and conceptual tools of epistemology bear on political philosophy--and vice versa. Organizational Epistemology. This book presents an in-depth perspective of knowledge as a fundamental process of any organization rather than just another resource to be managed.
The author presents a process-oriented theory of creating and applying knowledge directed towards both researchers and practitioners. In this book the author develops normative knowledge management guidelines.
What to Believe Now. Epistemology—as traditionally construed—is the study of knowledge. Part I of this volume covers each question in turn. In Chapter 1, Brian C. A justified belief is a belief backed by good reasons.
More specifically, knowledge requires reasons that are indicative of the truth, as opposed to practical, aesthetic, or moral reasons. Truth-directed reasons and the kind of justification they supply are epistemic, meaning that they pertain to knowledge. Epistemic justification receives special attention in epistemology, in part because it is the component of knowledge unique to the field.
In contrast, truth and belief are topics shared by other philosophical domains truth in logic and the philosophy of language, and belief in the philosophy of mind. In Chapter 2, Todd R. Internalists and externalists alike typically recognize both reason and experience as justificatory sources. But can all justification ultimately be traced to one fundamental source? The Source Question dominated much of early modern British philosophy.
In Chapter 3, K. This takes us to the Scope Question. Part II — Expanded Epistemology: Chapters 5—8 A familiar fact about philosophy is that answers tend to generate further questions. Traditional epistemology is no exception. New puzzles emerged directly from the traditional project. New questions also arose when connections were established between epistemology and other areas of thought both inside and outside of philosophy.
Moreover, some epistemologists grew dissatisfied with traditional assumptions and priorities. These developments did not displace traditional epistemology as much as expand it.
Part II of the volume is devoted to this expanded epistemology. Turns need not occur in distinct historical succession, and they are not necessarily discipline-wide, but they are significant enough to have lasting impact. A full account of epistemic value must address the relationship between it and value in other domains e.
Applying this idea to empirical hypothesis testing results in a theory of scientific confirmation, which can be utilized in the philosophy of science. Formal and value-driven epistemology initially inherited from traditional epistemology its focus on individuals considered in the abstract. This idealization ignores that people are epistemically affected by their social situatedness.
We exchange knowledge with others, disagree with one another, and engage in collaborative inquiry and decision-making. Accounting for social dimensions yields the social turn in epistemology.
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